Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach by Camerer, Colin F. & Lovallo, Dan
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
OVERCONFIDENCE AND EXCESS ENTRY: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
Colin Camerer 
California Institute of Technology 
Dan Lovallo 
One Vision Research, Inc. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 975 
July 1996 
Revised April 1998 
Overconfidence and Excess Entry: 
An Experimental Approach 
Colin Camerer and Dan Lovallo* 
Psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own relative 
abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures (e.g. Shelly E. Taylor and J.D. Brown, 
1988; Neil D. Weinstein, 1980). When assessing their position in a distribution of peers on 
almost any positive trait-- like driving ability (Ola Svenson, 1981 ), income prospects, or 
longevity-- a vast majority of people say they are above the average, although of course, only half 
can be (if the trait is symmetrically distributed). 1 
This paper explores whether optimistic biases could plausibly and predictably influence 
economic behavior in one particular setting-- entry into competitive games or markets. Many 
empirical studies show that most new businesses fail within a few years. For example, using 
plant level data from the U.S. Census of Manufacturers spanning 1963-1982, Timothy Dunne et 
al. (1988) estimated that 61.5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and 79.6 percent 
exited within 10 years. Most of these exits are failures (see also Dunne et al.. 1989a, 1989b; D. 
Shapiro and R.S. Khemani, 1987). 
Some possible explanations for the high rate of business failure are reviewed below. In this 
paper we consider the hypothesis that business failure is a result of managers acting on the 
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optimism about relative skill they exhibit in surveys (e.g., Jim March and Zur Shapira, 1987). 
This hypothesis is worth exploring because it is consistent with so much psychological evidence, 
and because optimistic overentry will persist if the performance feedback necessary to correct it 
is relatively noisy, infrequent, or slow. 
The idea that overconfidence causes business entry mistakes has, of course, been suggested 
before (e.g. Richard Roll, 1986) but has not been directly tested by measuring economic 
decisions and personal overconfidence simultaneously. To link the two we created an 
experimental setting with basic features of business entry situations. In the experiments, the 
success of entering subjects depends on their relative skill (compared to other entrants). Most 
subjects who enter think the total profit earned by all entrants to be negative, but their own profit 
will be positive. The findings are consistent with the prediction that overconfidence leads to 
excessive business entry. 
The experiments also develop a paradigm in which business entry and other skill-based 
competitions (e.g., labor market tournaments) could be studied further. The paradigm extends 
typical economics experiments by including a potentially potent psychological variable-- relative 
skill perceptions-- and also extends typical psychology experiments on overconfidence by adding 
financial incentives for judging one's skill accurately and a clear definition of the skill one is 
judging.2 
Of course, experimental data are hardly conclusive evidence that overconfidence plays a role 
in actual entry decisions by firms. A bigger scientific payoff comes when experimental 
observations suggest a new phenomenon that might be studied in the field. Our data suggest a 
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new phenomenon we call 'reference group neglect' . Excess entry is much larger when subjects 
volunteered to participate knowing that payoffs would depend on skill. These self-selected 
subjects seem to neglect the fact that they are competing with a reference group of subjects who 
all think they are skilled too. (Neglecting the increased level of competition is like the neglect of 
adverse selection which leads to the "winner's curse" in bidding.) 
I. Possible explanations for entrant failure 
There are three primary explanations for the frequency of entrant failure. The first 
explanation is that failures are frequent because entrants have only brief opportunities to make 
money. In this view, failures are actually hit-and-run entries that are profitable but brief. 
A second explanation is that business entries are expensive lottery tickets with positively 
skewed returns. In this view, although most firms expect to lose money and fail, entry still 
maximizes expected profits because the payoffs to success are very large. There are two variants 
of this argument: First, if small-business owners are risk-preferring or get psychic income from 
running businesses, then the expected utility from entering might be high even if expected profit 
is low. Second, it is well-known from multi-armed bandit problems that when sampling from 
unknown distributions of possible payoffs (such as career paths or profitable industries), it may 
pay to sample from 'arms' with negative expected payoffs if the possible payoffs from those 
arms is large (because sampling provides information about which arms to choose in the future). 
Models of occupational choice provide a clear life-cycle prediction based on this sampling 
motive for entry, since people should bear the risk of failure early in their careers, but not later 
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(e.g., Robert A. Miller, 1984). 
The third explanation is that many entry decisions are mistakes, made by boundedly rational 
decision makers. Firms could mistakenly enter too often for two different reasons-- they know 
their own skills but fail to appreciate how many competitors there will be (they have 
"competitive blind spots"), or they forecast competition accurately but overconfidently think 
their firm will succeed while most others will fail. 
In a natural setting it is difficult to distinguish between these three explanations for high 
failure rates. The overconfidence explanation is particularly hard to establish because it predicts 
that firms will enter even if they expect negative industry profits. But even if cumulative industry 
profits are actually negative at some point in time, it is possible positive returns will roll in later 
(or the industry simply made a large unpredictable forecasting mistake). So it is hard to imagine 
how to establish conclusively that expected industry returns were negative. 
While more field research is surely worthwhile, some progress might be made in the 
laboratory. In an experiment, everything needed to distinguish the three theories-- entry 
decisions, forecasts of industry profits, and forecasts of the number of total entrants-- can be 
measured. If subjects forecast positive industry profits and enter, the rational-entry theories 
appear correct. If subjects forecast positive industry profits, but they underestimate the amount 
of entry and industry profit turns out to be negative, then blind spots story appears correct. If 
subjects accurately forecast negative industry profits, and enter anyway, then the overconfidence 
explanation appears correct. 
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II. Experimental design 
Our experiments extend a paradigm first used by Daniel Kahneman (1988), Jim Brander and 
Richard Thaler, then explored more throughly by Amnon Rapoport and colleagues. 
In their game, N players choose simultaneously, and without communicating, whether to 
enter a market or not. The market 'capacity' is a preannounced number, c. If players stay out 
they earn a payment K. If the total number of entrants is E, the entrants each earn K+rK(c-E) 
(with rK>O). The optimal behavior is simple: Players want to enter only if the number of 
expected entrants (including themselves) is less than the capacity c. If they do enter, players 
prefer the number of entrants to be as small as possible. The interesting questions are whether 
the right number of players enter (is E around c?), whether E changes with c, and how players 
figure out whether to enter or not. 
Kahneman (1988) was surprised to see that the number of entrants, E, was typically in the 
range [c-2,c+2] even though subjects could not communicate or coordinate their decisions in any 
explicit way. 'To a psychologist,' he wrote, 'it looks like magic' . Rapoport (1995) replicated the 
results using Ph.D. students playing for much larger stakes. He also found that subjects entered a 
bit too frequently at first, but gradually E converged very close to c. E and c were highly 
correlated across trials. Extensions by James Sundali, Rapoport & Darryl A. Seale (1995) and 
Rapoport et al (1998) replicated the earlier findings. Rapoport, Seale, and Ordonez (1998) 
introduced probabilistic payoffs and showed that deviations from equilibrium entry could be 
parsimoniously explained by nonlinear transformations of entry probabilities. 
Our experiments extend this paradigm in four ways: Payoffs depend on a subject' s rank 
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(relative to other entrants); ranks depend on either a chance device, or on a subject's skill; 
subjects in some experiments are told in advance that the experiment depends on skill (and 
hence, more skilled subjects presumably self-select into the experiment); and subjects forecast 
the number of entrants in each period. 
Skill-dependent payoffs are the crucial new design feature. The early experiments capture an 
important aspect of entry-- tacit coordination among potential entrants to avoid excess entry-- but 
all entrants earned the same amount. In naturally-occurring settings, some entrants win and others 
lose, due at least partly to differences in managerial skill (see Kenneth R. MacCrimmon and 
Donald A. Wehrung, 1986). Besides being more realistic, differences in payoffs based on skill 
allow the possibility that overconfidence will lead to excess entry. 
Table 1 shows how payoffs depend on a subject' s rank and on the market capacity c. The top 
c entrants share $50 proportionally, with higher-ranking entrants earning more. All entrants 
ranking below the top c lose $10. For example, if the market capacity c=2, then the highest 
ranked entrant receives $33, the second highest ranked entrant receives $17, and any lower­
ranked entrant loses $10. (Subjects are staked $10 initially.) Notice that if the number of 
entrants is exactly c+S, then the total payoff to all entering subjects ( 'industry profit' ) is zero; if 
there are more than c+S entrants, the average entrant loses money. 
Actual ranks are assigned in two different ways: Each subject is ranked by a random 
drawing, and also ranked according to their relative performance on a skill or trivia task. Skill 
ranks are determined by how many questions subjects answer correctly on a sample of 10 logic 
puzzles (sessions 1-2) or trivia questions about sports or current events (sessions 3-8). It is 
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important to stress that subjects' ranks were not determined until the end of the experiment, after 
they made all their entry decisions in both the skill and random conditions. 
Here are the steps in each experimental session: 
1. Before the experiment, subjects were recruited using either standard recruiting instructions 
or 'self-selection' instructions. In the self-selection condition, subjects were asked if they would 
like to volunteer for an experiment in which performance on sports or current events trivia would 
determine their payoff, and people who were very good might earn a considerable sum of money. 
(They were also reminded in the experimental instructions that all subjects were recruited this 
way.) 
2. Subjects were seated in a large classroom where they could not see each other's materials. 
The instructions were read aloud and a comprehension test was given to guarantee understanding 
of the payoff table. The two types of ranking systems were explained and subjects were shown 
examples of the skill questions, along with sample answers. Subjects were informed that there 
would be two sequences of 12 rounds for each condition-- one for the random rank and another 
for the skill rank. Subjects were also informed that the decisions they made for one of the rounds, 
chosen randomly, would determine their payoff. 
Individual rounds proceed as follows: 
3. Subjects were told whether skill or random ranks are being used in that round, and the 
capacity c. Table 2 shows the capacities used in each round. The same sequence of capacities 
was used in the two consecutive conditions. 
4. Subjects privately forecasted how many entrants they expected would enter (including 
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themselves) in the round. They earned $.25 for each forecast that was correct. These forecasts 
distinguish the hypothesis that too many subjects enter because they underestimate the number of 
competitors ( 'blind spots' )  from the hypothesis that subjects forecast entry accurately, but 
entrants all think they are above average. 
5. Subjects made their entry decisions privately and simultaneously.3 
6. Entry decisions were recorded and subjects were told how many total entrants there were 
in the round. Thus, the only feedback that subjects received after each round is the total number 
of entrants for each period. 
7. At the end of the experimental session, after all of the rounds in both conditions were 
played, subjects either solved puzzles or took the trivia quiz, and their skill rank was determined 
and announced. Then one of the subjects randomly chose one of the 24 rounds and subjects' 
earnings from that round were computed and paid to them. 
It is important to reiterate that the only feedback subjects got throughout the session of 24 
rounds was the total number of entrants per round. This design was chosen to model initial entry 
behavior by firms that do not learn much about their competitive advantage until after they incur 
substantial nonsalvageable fixed costs. The question of how post-entry feedback about 
performance impacts subsequent behavior is interesting, of course-- it is certainly likely that 
overconfidence would be diminished if subjects were given a separate skill test and told their 
ranks after each round. But it is natural to begin by establishing whether overconfidence is 
present in the first place, before turning to the question of what forces make it go away. 
The procedures described above were used in eight sessions. Table 3 summarizes differences 
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in treatment variables across sessions.4 In half of the experimental sessions the random rank 
condition rounds were conducted first; in the other half the skill rank rounds were first. Four 
sessions involved self-selected subjects (who knew trivia skill would help) and four sessions did 
not. 
A. Equilibrium predictions 
Assuming risk-neutrality, there are many pure strategy Nash equilibria in which c+4 or c+5 
subjects enter (the fifth subject is indifferent since he or she expects to earn zero from entering). 
Since the pure-strategy equilibria are necessarily asymmetric, it is hard to see how they might 
arise without communication or some coordinating device, like history, sequential moves or 
public labels distinguishing subjects. There is also a unique symmetric mixed-strategy 
equilibrium in which (risk-neutral) players enter with a probability close to (c+5)/N (see Dan 
Lovallo and Colin Camerer, 1996). 
Relaxing the assumption of risk-neutrality, there is no way to determine the equilibrium 
number of entrants without measuring or making specific assumptions about subjects' risk 
preferences.5 The random rank condition gives an empirical estimate of observed equilibrium 
without having to impose any a priori assumption about risk preferences. Since each subject 
participates in both random- and skill-rank conditions, their decisions in the random-rank 
condition act as a within-subject control for risk preferences. The difference in the number of 
entrants in the random and skill conditions is the primary measure of interest. 
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III. Results 
A. Does Overconfidence about Skill Increase Entry? 
Table 4 lists the total amount of money earned by subjects ( 'industry profit' ) per round in 
each experimental session, by rank condition. Recall that if c subjects enter, total industry profit 
is $50. If c+5 enter total profits are 0. 
The main question is whether there is more entry (and lower industry profit) when people are 
betting on their own relative skill rather than on a random device. The answer is 'Yes' : In the 
majority of the random rank rounds (75/96 or 77 percent) industry profit is strictly positive6 and 
total profit is negative only six times (6 percent). Average industry profit across rounds is $16.87. 
In contrast, in the skill rank rounds industry profit is strictly positive in only 38 rounds (40 
percent) and negative in 40 (42 percent). Average profit across the skill rank rounds is -$1.56. 
The difference in average profits between the conditions is $18.43, which is about two extra 
entrants per round in the skill conditions (about a third of the number expected to not enter). 
A powerful statistical test of significance exploits the yoked design by comparing industry 
profit in each pair of skill rank and random rank periods in exactly the same periods of 
experimental sessions t and t+ 1 (for t=l,3,5,7). In this comparison, each pair of periods has 
exactly the same location in experimental time and the same value of c, and differ only in 
whether ranks were due to skill or chance. (Fixed effects of periods, self-selection, and subject 
pool are all controlled for by this comparison.) A matched-pair t-test using these comparisons 
yields t=-7.43 (dof=95, p<.0001). Industry profits under skill-based entry are clearly lower. 
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The next question is whether reference group neglect produces a larger skill-random entry 
differential in the experiments with self-selected subjects. The answer appears to be "Yes". In 
sessions without self-selection (1-4), the average per period industry profit is $19.79 and $10.83 
for the random and skill conditions, respectively, a difference of $9.14 or about one extra entrant 
in the skill-based rounds. In sessions with self-selection (5-8) profit is $13.96 in the random 
condition and -$13 .13 in the skill condition, which results in an entry differential of $27 .10, 
about three times as large as in the sessions without self-selection. Furthermore, in the 
experiments with self-selection, industry profits are positive in only 3 of the 48 skill rank periods, 
compared with 34 of 48 in the non-self-selected sessions. A matched-pairs test comparing the 
skill-random profit differentials for matched periods between sessions 1-4 and 5-8 strongly 
rejects the hypothesis that differentials are the same in sessions with and without self-selection 
(t(94)=-4.08, p<.001). Reference group neglect clearly makes the overconfidence effect stronger. 
B. Expected Earnings Differences in Skill and Random Rounds 
The matched-pairs tests illustrate the effect of overconfidence on entry and demonstrate that 
self-selection makes the effect stronger. But these tests do not carefully control for all alternative 
explanations.7 For example, the blind spots hypothesis suggests that excessive entry in the skill 
conditions may be due to players underforecasting how many others will enter. 
To test this hypothesis, we use subject j's forecast Fiit to compute the profit that subject j 
expects the average entrant to earn in round t of experiment i. If the capacity is cit in that 
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particular period, then the "expected average profit" -- the amount of profit subject j thinks the 
average entrant will earn-- is (50-10*(Fiit-ci1))/Fiil' which we denote by Ei(Iliit). This method 
effectively separates the blind spot hypothesis from the overconfidence hypothesis. Suppose, for 
example, that in skill conditions subjects are more apt to enter because they think fewer people 
will enter, not because they feel they are more skilled. Then their Ei(Iliit) values will be larger in 
the skill condition. Including Ei(Iliit) in an entry regression will then wipe out the effect 
spuriously attributed to skill. 
If entering subjects are more overconfident in the skill rounds, then their expected average 
profits E(Ilii1) will be smaller than in random rounds because the skilled subjects expect to earn 
more than the average entrant and hence, are willing to enter even when the expected average 
profit is low. To test this prediction, Table 5 reports the difference between expected average 
profits in random rounds (denoted ITr) and the same statistic in skill rounds (IT8,), using only the 
rounds in which a subject entered. The table shows three different measures for each session: The 
mean difference ITr - ITs averaged across entering subjects, the number and percentage of subjects 
who have a negative mean (i.e., who expect less average profit in skill periods), and the number 
and percentage of subjects whose expected average profit is negative, on average, across skill 
periods. 
In sessions without self-selection (1-4) the mean difference ITr - ITS is generally positive and 
modestly significant, 60 percent of the subjects expect to earn less in skill periods, but only a few 
subjects ( 4 percent) actually expect losses in skill periods. In the sessions with self-selection ( 4-
8) the statistics are more striking: There are large, modestly significant average differences Ilr -
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II, in all four sessions, almost all subjects expect to earn less in skill periods than in random 
periods, and 85 percent of the subjects have negative expected average profits in skill periods. 
The large majority of subjects in the self-selection sessions seem to be saying, 'I expect the 
average entrant to lose money, but not me!' . 
C. Regression Estimates of the Overconfidence Effect 
Another way to see the size and significance of all the variables' effects at once is a lo git 
regression in which the dependent variable is subject j' s 0-1 entry decision (enter= l) in round t of 
experiment i, Dijt· The logit includes controls for period-specific intercepts (to capture any 
period-by-period influences on entry), a subject pool dummy (MBA=l), a self-selection 
condition dummy (RNG=l), capacity C, and a skill-rank dummy (Skill=l). 
Table 6 shows the results of the logit regression of entry decisions.8 Period-specific dummy 
variables were never significant and are not reported. Curiously, E(Iliit) enters with a negative 
sign, implying that when subjects expect high average profit they enter less often. This odd 
result is robust to several specifications but it does not disrupt inferences about skill.9 The 
dummy variable MBA enters positively but the MBA *skill interaction does not. 
Most importantly, the effect of the Skill condition variable is significantly positive (t=2.48) in 
the full model but the interaction of self-selection and skill, RNG*Skill, is insignificant. The 
middle column drops the uninteresting variables MBA, MBA *Skill, and the insignificant main 
effect of RNG. Then RNG* skill becomes significant (t= 1.90), confirming that self-selection 
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significantly increases the tendency to enter more frequently when payoffs depend on skill.10 The 
right column excludes the RNG*skill interaction, which increases the estimated coefficient and 
significance of the pure skill effect (t=4.83). Comparing the log-likelihoods with and without 
RNG*Skill also shows that including it improves fit significantly (X2=3.6, p=.05), corroborating 
the results of the t-test. 
D. Additional analyses: Forecasts and equilibrium behavior 
Since subjects forecasted the number of entrants in each period, we can test whether their 
forecasts reflect rational use of available information (see Lovallo and Camerer, 1996, for more 
details). Forecasts are slightly biased: In random conditions subjects forecast about .30 entrants 
too high, and in skill conditions they forecast .50 entrants too low (the latter bias is significantly 
negative at p<.05). We have no explanation for these small biases and do not attach much 
economic significance to them. For most subjects, forecasts pass the standard rationality tests 
because forecast errors are not predicted by observable information (i.e., by previous errors, or by 
the current forecast level). When errors are predictable, they tend to flip in the opposite direction 
of previous errors, and errors are positively correlated with levels (i.e., when forecasts are high, 
they are too high so the forecast error is positive). 
Compared to other economics experiments in which paid forecasts have been gathered (cf. 
Camerer, 1995, pp. 609-612), the informational rationality of these forecasts is quite good. This 
fact is important because it means subjects are not generally irrational in processing information 
and they do not overenter because they underforecast the amount of competition. They are just 
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overconfident about their relative skill. 
The time series of matched-pair skill-random differentials in entry has a slight downward 
trend across periods. This raises the important question of whether the effect of overconfidence 
on entry would disappear if the experiment were run longer. A helpful way to forecast the 
answer is to fit a time series model which estimates the long-run differential by extrapolating 
from twelve periods of data to what would happen if the experiment were run forever (see 
Camerer, 1987). Our working paper reports estimates from three different models. One model 
assumes partial adaptation of deviations from long-run equilibrium. Two other models assume 
those deviations drop with the reciprocal or reciprocal square root of the period number. The 
three techniques yield estimated differentials of 1.96, 1.79, and 1.34 (all of which are highly 
significant). 
These numbers suggest that even if the experiment was repeated for a much longer time, one 
or two more subjects would enter when their payoffs depend on skill, relative to the number who 
enter than when payoffs are random. Keep in mind that an average of 5 or 6 subjects are 
predicted to stay out in each period (depending on the design). Two extra entrants means that 
more than a third of the number who are predicted to stay out actually enter. 
IV. Discussion 
Empirical studies show a high rate of business failure. We explored whether overconfidence 
about relative ability is part of the explanation for excessive failure by creating experimental 
entry games in which entrants' payoffs depend on their skill. 
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When subjects' post-entry payoffs are based on their own abilities, individuals tend to 
overestimate their chances of relative success and enter more frequently (compared to a condition 
in which payoffs do not depend on skill). The more surprising finding is that overconfidence is 
even stronger when subjects self-select into the experimental sessions, knowing their success will 
depend partly on their skill (and that others have self-selected too). In these sessions, there is so 
much entry that the average subject loses money in 34 out of 48 periods, and earns money in only 
four periods. This result suggest a new phenomenon specific to competition, 'reference group 
neglect' -- the tendency to underadjust to changes in the reference group one competes with. 
Reference group neglect is one byproduct of a psychological phenomenon called the "inside 
view" (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). An inside view forecast is generated by focusing on the 
abilities and resources of a particular group, constructing scenarios of future progress, and 
extrapolating current trends. In contrast, an "outside view" ignores special details of the case at 
hand, constructs a class of cases similar to the current one, and guesses where the current case 
lies in that class (cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The inside view tells a colorful story; the 
outside view recites statistics. In the inside view, there is no special role for anticipation of the 
number of competitors or their abilities. In the outside view, the fact that most entries fail cannot 
be ignored. 
Reference group neglect was nicely expressed by Joe Roth, chairman of Walt Disney Studios, 
when he was asked why so many expensive big-budget movies are released on the same 
weekends (such as Memorial Day and Independence Day). Roth replied: 
"Hubris. Hubris. If you only think about your own business, you think, 'I've got a good story 
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department, I've got a good marketing department, we' re going to go out and do this.' And you 
don' t think that everybody else is thinking the same way. In a given weekend in a year you'll 
have five movies open, and there's certainly not enough people to go around." (emphasis ours; 
Los Angeles Times, 1996). 
A. Some testable economic implications 
Experimental results are especially useful when they suggest implications which are testable 
with naturally-occurring data. If people are generally overconfident about their relative abilities, 
then in industries or professions where overconfidence is likely to be largest, industry profits or 
total wages (including costs of training) may be negative. This brings us full circle to the 
empirical facts about business failure, and the difficulty of clearly establishing negative industry 
profit. The key to empirical tests which distinguish overconfidence from other explanations is to 
find variables which predict levels of overconfidence and see if they correlate with the tendency 
for overall profit to be negative. For example, when the criterion for success is more vague, 
people or firms should be more likely to overcompete, since ambiguity permits excess optimism. 
This implies that in professions where success can be achieved by different types of people, or 
industries with highly differentiated products, excess entry is more likely. For example, the skills 
required to be a successful model seem to be narrower than the skills required to be a successful 
actor. If so, your waiter at a Los Angeles restaurant is more likely to be an aspiring actor than an 
aspiring model. 
The overconfidence hypothesis also predicts that people will prefer performance-based 
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incentives schemes more often than standard theory predicts. Standard theory predicts that as 
output variance rises, principals who can bear risk should offer less output-sensitive contracts to 
agents (who presumably dislike risk). Overconfidence predicts that agents will be relatively 
insensitive to risk; indeed, when risk is high their overconfidence might lead them to prefer 
riskier contracts because they think they can beat the odds. There is some evidence from 
sharecropping that the standard prediction is wrong, and the overconfidence prediction may be 
right: Crops with larger yield variation are more likely to be farmed with cash leases, where 
farmers pay a fixed fee to lease the land and bear all the crop risk themselves (e.g., Douglas W. 
Allen and Dean Lueck, 1995). Other evidence from franchising and mining show that risk 
variables play a small role in contract determination; the existence of overconfidence may 
explain why. 
Reference group neglect predicts that when agents compete based on skill, they will be 
insufficiently sensitive to the quality of competition. This has at least three testable implications: 
First, people will gather too little data about the nature of their competitors when deciding 
whether to enter.11 
Second, reference group neglect predicts that people will be insensitive to whether their 
competitors are forced to compete or choose to compete. Empirical tests could compare a 
situation in which entry is dictated by regulation or law, with a similar situation in which people 
can opt in or out. Reference group neglect predicts a higher failure rate in the latter cases.12 
Third, in hierarchical tournaments where 'winners' at one level advance to the next level, 
reference group neglect predicts that overconfidence will get stronger and stronger as people 
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advance13• As workers win each level of the tournament, their success is certainly a positive 
signal of ability relative to the tournament losers left behind, but every other winner has received 
the same positive signal too. If winners neglect the fact that competition increases at each level, 
they will become more overconfident at each new level. Educational attainment might be an 
example. Freshman students at a highly selective college will be overconfident (neglecting the 
large increase in competition from their high school to college) and the effect will get stronger if 
they go to graduate school. Promotion tracks in businesses could produce the same pattern of 
snowballing overconfidence: Perhaps as cream rises to the top, hubris does too. 
Reference group neglect predicts an opposite bias when workers lose tournaments and 
consider whether to enter 'consolation' tournaments with other losers. Losing workers will be 
underconfident if they neglect how easy the new competition is. For example, recently-fired 
workers will have unusually long spells of unemployment (compared to the spell length predicted 
by optimal search theory), if they lick their wounds rather than compete with other recently-fired 
workers by searching. 
In addition to reference group neglect and its testable implications, an important implication 
of our study is methodological. In some settings with uncertainty, it is sensible to characterize 
economic agents as making decisions about random events, and use chance devices in the lab to 
mimic such events. However, when agents are betting on their own abilities, assuming that 
random luck and skill are the same is a mistake (cf. Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Indeed, 
we reach different conclusions about equilibrium predictions when we use skill-based payoffs 
instead of random payoffs-- they enter more when betting on their skill. This is not to say that 
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the subjects behave irrationally-- indeed, they forecast the number of competitors quite well, and 
most pass tests of expectational rationality. They are simply overconfident; and the inside view 
which creates that confidence leads them to neglect the quality of their competition. 
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1. There are interesting exceptions-- most people demurely say they are not in the very top decile 
or quintile, but merely above average; for many traits, women are less optimistic than men (and 
even overly pessimistic; e.g., Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, 1974), and clinically depressed 
patients are not optimistic (e.g., Lauren B. Alloy and Ahrens, Anthony H. 1987). The latter finding 
calls into question the common psychiatric presumption that "realistic" people are well-adjusted 
and happy, and also raises the question of whether unrealistic optimism might be evolutionarily 
adaptive (e.g., Lionel Tiger, 1979). Michael Waldman (1994) shows how such optimism could be 
evolutionarily stable, and mentions conditions under which gender differences like those observed 
empirically could arise. 
2. Earlier studies showed that overconfidence is smaller when traits are defined ambiguously--
' driving ability' is more ambiguous than 'ability to brake quickly to avoid an accident' (David 
Dunning et al, 1989). 
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3. In one session, not reported here, we allowed decisions to be made sequentially. This means 
that a subject moving after c+5 entrants have already entered knows for sure that the total 
payment to subjects will be negative; entering in that condition is the strongest possible evidence 
that subjects are relatively overconfident. Roughly the same number of subjects entered in that 
session, but too few data are available from the single session to draw firmer conclusions. 
4. Business students, especially MBAs, are an appropriate sample because many go on to start 
businesses or participate in corporate entry decisions (e.g., entrepreneurship is the fifth most 
popular major among Wharton MB As). 
5. An alternative is to try to induce risk-neutrality (or some other specific degree of risk-aversion) 
by paying subjects in units of probability (see Joyce E. Berg, et al, 1986). We chose to use the 
random rank condition because the probability procedure does not induce risk-neutrality reliably 
(see Vesna Prasnikar, 1996, and Reinhard Selten, Karim Sadrieh, and Klaus Abbink 1995), and 
the random-rank condition is equally theoretically valid, and simpler. 
6. This is also consistent with tacit collusion among risk-neutral players, since having exactly c 
entrants is the collusive solution (but is not a Nash equilibrium), or with some degree of risk­
aversion or (more likely) loss-aversion. 
7. Gender could be confounded with self-selection, too, since women may be less likely to volunteer 
for tasks which reward expertise in sports trivia (and are usually found to be less overconfident than 
men, in general). We controlled for this by only recruiting male subjects in sessions 3-8. Thus, the 
logit analysis of sessions 3-8 effectively controls for gender. 
8.The regression uses only data from sessions 3-8 because sessions 1-2 used a different task (logic 
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puzzles rather than trivia) and did not include self-selection as a treatment, so including it does not 
give much extra power for estimating the effect of RNG. 
9. We also included capacity C as a  series of dummy variables (to capture nonlinearity in the effect 
of C on entry), and included interactions between E(Iliit) and Skill, and between E(�i1) and C. None 
of these specifications improved the fit substantially or eliminated the significant negative coefficient 
on E(Ilii1). We suspect the result occurs because when subjects plan to enter, they also forecast a lot 
of entry, so the expected average profit E(�i1) is lower when they enter. This could be due to a 'false 
consensus' in which subjects use their own decision as a clue about what others will do (and, 
because of optimism, they do not let their forecast inhibit their own entry). 
10. Excluding the RNG*skill interaction from the second model raises the estimated coefficient and 
significance of the pure skill effect ( .450, t=4.83 ), which suggests that the precision of the estimates 
of skill and RNG*skill in the middle-column specification are a lot lower because of the colinearity 
between skill and RNG*skill. Comparing the log-likelihoods with and without RNG*Skill also 
shows that including it improves fit significantly (X2=3.6, p=.05). 
11. For example, prospective doctoral students often do not ask about exam failure rates or what 
jobs all graduates get, and academics are surprisingly unfamiliar with acceptance rates of different 
journals they submit articles to. These 'outside view' statistics only make cameo appearances in the 
success stories people project for themselves. 
12. An example is the difference between an army that drafts citizens to serve and a regime in which 
soldiers volunteer. Reference group neglect predicts that soldiers who aspire to become high-ranking 
officers will be too optimistic about their chances when they volunteer (because many volunteers 
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will share the same ambition). A similar test could turn on differences between compulsory and 
voluntary education, or differences between required core courses and electives (students will be 
more overconfident about their success in the latter courses). 
13. Possible examples include political competition, "rat races" in professional firms, athletic 
competition, educational competition for entrance into elite colleges and graduate schools, and 
entertainment industries where entry is easy and a few "superstar" workers earn large rewards 
(such as acting and screenwriting). 
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Table 1 • Rank Based Payoffs 
Payoff for Successful Entrants as a function of "C" 
Rank 2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 11 
2 17 15 12 10 
3 10 10 8 
4 5 7 7 
5 5 6 
6 2 4 
7 3 
8 2 
Table 2 • Market Capacity "C" Values 
Rounds Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiments 3 - 6 Experiments 7 & 8 
1 2 8 2 4 
2 4 4 6 2 
3 8 2 4 6 
4 6 6 4 8 
5 4 4 2 6 
6 2 2 6 4 
7 8 8 4 2 
8 6 6 6 8 
9 4 4 2 6 
10 6 2 6 4 
11 8 8 4 2 
12 2 6 2 8 
Table 3 • Description of Experiments 
Experiment # Sample n Selection Procedure Rank Order 
1 Chicago, undergraduates 12 random R/S 
2 Chicago, undergraduates 14 random SIR 
3 Wharton, undergraduates 16 random R/S 
4 Wharton, undergraduates 16 random SIR 
5 Wharton, undergraduates 16 self-selection R/S 
6 Wharton, undergraduates 16 self-selection SIR 
7 Chicago, M.B.A.'s 14 self-selection R/S 
8 Wharton, M.B.A.'s 14 self-selection SIR 
Table 4 g Industry Profit by Round 
Profit for Random Rank condition 
Rounds 
Experiment# n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1 12 50 50 20 30 40 30 20 50 30 40 20 40 420 
2 14 0 -10 10 20 -10 10 20 10 0 0 30 20 100 
3 16 10 50 20 40 10 20 30 40 20 40 30 20 330 
4 16 0 10 10 20 10 -10 0 10 20 10 0 20 100 
5 16 20 10 10 10 0 0 30 20 -10 0 0 0 90 
6 16 30 20 10 0 -10 30 20 10 10 30 10 20 180 
7 14 10 20 40 20 30 40 -30 40 10 0 0 20 200 
8 14 20 10 0 30 30 0 10 10 20 10 20 40 200 
Profit for Skill Rank Condition 
Rounds 
Experiment# N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 12 Total 
1 12 50 0 20 10 30 10 20 10 40 10 10 30 240 
2 14 0 -10 10 20 -10 10 20 10 0 0 30 20 100 
3 16 10 20 10 20 0 10 20 10 10 30 20 10 180 
4 16 0 0 20 20 10 -30 10 -10 -10 10 -20 0 0 
5 16 -30 -20 -20 -10 -40 -10 -30 0 -30 -10 -20 0 ·220 
6 16 10 -40 -20 -30 -10 -30 -10 -20 -20 -10 0 0 ·180 
7 14 -40 -10 -10 0 -20 -10 -40 0 0 0 -10 0 -140 
8 14 10 -10 -10 -10 -20 -20 -20 0 -20 10 -20 -20 -130 
Table 5 - Average Difference in Expected Profits Per Entrant between 
Random and Skill Conditions 
Meas11rc Exp. I Exp.2 Exp.3 Exp. 4 Exp.5 Exp. 6 Exp. 7 Exp.8 Total 
n.-n, 1.635 0.477 -1.19 0.24 1.62 2.49 3.16 1.80 I.31 
(198) ( l .41) (l.72) (2.4 l) (l.32) (l.27) (161) ( l .20) (2.04) 
#of S's with i0/l2 10/Ll 3/ 11 7/14 ] 2/l 3 12113 I 3/13 I !/l 2 78/HH 
rr .. - ns <() (509{;) (92%) (92'k) (100%) (92%) (77%) 
#of S's with 0/12 0/13 0/12 2/15 12115 15/l 6 12114 I l/l4 52/111 
Il,<0 (0%) (0%) (O'Yn) (13%) (80%) (94%) (86%) (79%) (47%) 
Table 6: logit estimation of entry equation (session 3-8, n=2204) 
Dependent Variable: Entry (=1) 
Variable Estimate 
Intercept -0887 
c .233 
E(1%) -.129 
Skill .375 
MBA .283 
RNG .011 
MBA*Skill .196 
RNG*Skill .078 
LL -1366.8 
% Correct 64.84% 
(t-stat) 
(-3.28) 
(6.93) 
(-6.93) 
(2.48) 
(l.76) 
(.01) 
(.83) 
(.35) 
Estimate (t-stat) Estimate 
-.855 (-3.40) -.865 
.257 (7.99) .258 
-.126 (-6.65) -.144 
.286 (2.26) .450 
.299 (1.90) 
-1372.5 -1374.3 
64.02% 64.34% 
(t-stat) 
(-3.2 1 ) 
(8.06) 
(-8.72) 
(4.83) 
